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ABSTRACT 
 
Loss aversion manifests as a decision bias in which avoiding losses is preferred 
over acquiring rewards and can drastically alter an individual’s decision-making by 
overweighting potential losses relative to gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, 
individuals may require greater positive compensation to offset potential losses, exhibit 
contradictory choice preferences, or even avoid the decision entirely; and this behavior 
may be ascribed to an over-reliance on automatic, unconscious (intuitive) judgments 
rather than initiating analytic reasoning more capable of objectively evaluating outcomes. 
 Religion (specifically Christianity) is the topic of focus, as preliminary evidence 
suggests an individual’s intuitive inclinations positively correlate with and predict 
religious beliefs. Moreover, self-reported religious beliefs significantly differed as a 
function of inducing either intuitive or reflective mindsets. Therefore, the purpose of this 
experiment was to test the hypothesis that religious participants will display significantly 
greater levels of loss aversion than nonreligious participants.  
This hypothesis extends from a previous study relating large-scale cultural and 
religious differences with loss aversion. While their results revealed religious orthodoxy 
strongly influenced loss aversion, the parameters elicited may be less stable as only two 
lottery questions were asked and religion was determined by cultural demographics. This 
study used the same design, but with a total of ten lotteries and a more detailed 
investigation into individual religious factors. 
 While loss aversion coefficients replicated the overall behavioral effect (Median θ 
= 2.6), independent sample, Mann-Whitney U tests did not yield any significant 
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differences between Christian and Nonreligious participants (p > 0.05); nor did any of the 
religious factors examined account for a significant amount of variability. 
 This study attempted to add to current knowledge by further conflating the 
relationship between religiosity and adaptive decision strategies susceptible to errant and 
inconsistent behavior. While the hypotheses were unsupported, a null finding is still 
important, and future research re-testing this association or introducing causational 
designs may prove more fruitful in understanding these complex relationships.  
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DEFINITIONS 
Expected Value (EV) – the average payout of a gamble over repeated trials, but can be 
applied to single-event likelihoods. This is calculated as summing the products of every 
outcome’s probability and quantitative value. This value is then multiplied by the number 
of times the gamble is offered. If a coin is flipped 10 times to win either $10 or $0, the 
EV is ((.5 * $10) + (.5 * $0)) * (10) = $50. A single coin-flip would therefore yield an EV 
of $5. 
 
Certainty Equivalent (CE) – a guaranteed payout that acts as a deterrent to a 
probabilistic outcome. Instead of accepting the above coin-flip gamble, an individual may 
prefer a certain $6 reward instead. The expected value of a CE is the given amount 
multiplied by the number of times it is offered: ((1.0 * $6) * (n)) = $6 * n. The expected 
values of the gamble and CE are then compared to determine which choice is statistically 
optimal. 
 
Indifference Point – The point at which an individual switches their preference between 
choices; the options are of roughly equal value. If an individual prefers the guaranteed 
outcome when the CE is $6, but prefers the gamble when the CE is $4, the indifference 
point is about $5.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
RISK PREFERENCES 
Individuals often make decisions involving degrees of uncertainty in the 
outcomes, the consequences of which are unbeknownst prior to their manifestation. 
While much of what an individual risks in daily decisions is tolerable (not bringing an 
umbrella, transportation, indulging in a scratch-off lotto ticket), empirical evidence has 
revealed the aversive qualities of risk-taking in pursuit of large rewards when a 
guaranteed, lesser reward may appeal as an alternative. Conversely, individuals may 
avoid guaranteed outcomes when presented as losses/punishments (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Moreover, decision-makers may 
show a general reluctance to engage in 50-50 mixed-frame gambles unless the expected 
gains are roughly twice as much as potential losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; 
Kahneman, 2003; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). These behavioral phenomena 
intending to reduce uncertainty and negative outcomes, referred to as ‘risk aversion’ and 
‘loss aversion’ respectively (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), are illustrated by a subjective 
overweighting of the dissatisfaction derived from forgoing guaranteed gains, or 
experiencing losses relative to gains of equivalent magnitudes. 
An important distinction must be made here between two different types of 
uncertainty in judgments and choices - risk and ambiguity. Although these terms are 
often linguistically interchangeable, they diverge semantically. Risky outcomes are those 
with clearly-defined, measurable probabilities (e.g., a 50% chance of success: coin-flip) 
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while ambiguity refers to outcomes with vaguely defined or even undefined likelihoods 
(e.g., “some” chance of success) that requires individuals to make subjective probability 
estimates (Knight, 1921). Because behavioral decision research primarily concerns the 
analysis of judgments and choices under risk, one must be careful in how results are 
interpreted within more ecological, ambiguous contexts. Nonetheless, models of 
decision-making strive to generalize observed behavior and have effectively 
demonstrated how these choice dynamics can fundamentally influence social and 
economic processes, such as marketing and consumption preferences, negotiations, and 
politics (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005; Carnevale, 2008; McDermott, 2004). 
Additionally, some have established religion as a framework for guiding such 
dispositions, perceptions and choices in life (Hommel & Colzato, 2010; Hui, Chan, Lau, 
Cheung, & Mok, 2014). 
 
RELIGION 
Religion has played an integral role in human existence and development over 
thousands of years and holds an almost ubiquitously entrenched presence across human 
civilizations, with approximately 80% of people worldwide (Pew Forum Research, 2012) 
and 78% of U.S. residents (Pew Forum Research, 2014) identifying with a religious 
group. While some researchers have argued for the emergence and evolution of religion 
within a cultural context (Henrich, 2009; Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan & Henrich, 2011; 
Norenzayan et al., 2016), others have asserted a purely biological origin stemming from 
the evolutionary adaptations of cognitive machinery (Bloom, 2007; Boyer & Bergstrom, 
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2008), such as executive functioning (Friedman et al., 2008), that may motivate 
intuitively causational ascriptions (Baumard & Boyer, 2013) to terrestrial events 
(Kelemen, 2004; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), assuaging the anxiety of environmental 
uncertainty (Preston & Epley, 2005, 2009). Regardless of religion’s exact genesis, it 
persists as a prevalent belief structure shaping one’s behavior through, but not limited to, 
increased self-control and regulation, and prescribing intrinsically oriented goals that 
temper hedonistic pursuits (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). 
 
PRESENT STUDY 
 Research aimed at studying religiosity has revealed significant relationships 
between religious behavior - comfort, importance, prayer frequency and service 
attendance, and increased risk aversion (Miller, 2000; Noussair, Trautmann, Kuilen, & 
Vellekoop, 2013). Moreover, Rieger, Wang and Hens (2011) found preliminary evidence 
suggesting Christian orthodoxy exerts a significantly stronger influence on loss aversive 
behavior. However, the scope of Rieger and colleagues’ study was a large-scale, cross-
cultural and economic analysis of risk preferences, and their results were not intended to 
be used on an individual level. Therefore, the purpose of this research project is a 
modified replication and extension of their work, but with individual metrics of 
religiosity. 
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RISK PREFERENCES 
PROSPECT THEORY 
Prospect Theory (PT; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was introduced as an 
alternative to the normative economic model of Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli, 
1738/1954), which had largely dominated the study of decision-making under risk. 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) posited that risk aversion resulted from subjectivity when 
assessing [dis]utility (the [dis]satisfaction derived from the acquisition or loss of valued 
stimuli) of choices, and proposed a set of axioms aiding in the objective analysis of 
probabilistic judgments and choices. Satisfying these axioms will then, on average, lead 
to statistically optimal outcomes and utility maximization, and mathematicians John Von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) later rigorously proved a series of conditions 
under which these axioms hold.  
The three primary conditions of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theorem, as 
well as those challenged by PT are: completeness, transitivity, and independence. 
Completeness assumes economic agents have well-defined preferences; Transitivity 
assumes these preferences will remain stable across a series of choices (i.e., if A > B, and 
B > C, then A > C); and Independence assumes this order of preferences will remain 
stable, even when the first two are presented independently of the third (i.e., A>B>C and 
A>B; although this axiom is controversial because its application can actually sometimes 
lead to B>A - Allais, 1953). The seminal paper of Prospect Theory, as well as their work 
surrounding it (Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981), sought to 
demonstrate inconsistencies in these axioms and offer explanations for them. By 
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providing participants with probabilistic scenarios and gambles, they were able to elicit 
choices violating statistical intuitions and how risk-averse behavior could lead to 
preference reversals. 
 
 alternative to EUT 
The main conclusions of PT supplanted EUT as the predominant, descriptive 
explanation for decision-making under risk, asserting the disutility of losses was a 
significantly stronger force on behavior than originally accredited (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Additionally, utility was no longer derived from purely an agent’s 
overall status (i.e., total wealth) the outcome of a gamble contributed to; rather, it was 
based on localized reference points (i.e., how much has been currently gained or lost) and 
[dis]utility was judged by deviations from those baselines. This created an S-shaped 
function (Figure 1) where an individual’s subjective value of a loss is greater than a gain 
of equivalent magnitude. 
 
Figure 1. - A hypothetical value function proposed by Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 
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 This judgment of potential losses exerting a more potent disutility was theorized 
to lead individuals to avoid engaging in statistically optimal behavior involving 
uncertainty, or decision outcomes with similarly valued rewards and losses, ‘risk’ and 
‘loss’ aversion, respectively. Risk aversion can be characterized by accepting a lower, 
guaranteed value over the potential to gain a probabilistic choice with a greater expected 
value (the average payout of a decision over repeated trials, but is also used to describe 
single-event values). And contextual conditions such as the magnitude of outcomes, the 
type of gamble played, and the likelihood of an outcome may all play an important role in 
judgments and choice dynamics by altering one’s propensity to accept guaranteed 
amounts or take risks. 
 First, the magnitude of an outcome may significantly affect an individual’s 
preferences by decreasing risk behavior as the stakes rise or increasing risk-taking in 
minute stakes (Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007). Next, the type of 
gamble, or frame in which the decision is presented, significantly impacts risk 
preferences, illustrated in the now classic ‘Asian Disease Problem’ presented below 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; percentage of respondents favoring the choice in 
parentheses): 
 
Problem 1 (N = 152): Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat 
the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. (72%) 
OR 
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If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be 
saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. (28%) 
 
Now consider another problem in which the same cover story is followed by a different 
description of the prospects associated with the two programs: 
 
Problem 2 (N = 155): 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. (22%) 
OR 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will dies and 
a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. (78%) 
 
 framing effects 
This research by Tversky and Kahneman has demonstrated how different frames 
can yield preference reversals - gain frames dampen risk-taking, while loss frames tend to 
promote risk-taking - and they suggest that gains and losses are processed differently, 
according to the aforementioned reference points. Despite the statistical equivalency of 
the decision scenarios, the gain condition is focused on saving lives and therefore 
processed as a reward by increasing the reference point; the loss condition is focused on 
losing lives, evoking a much more emotional process that seeks to maintain the current 
reference point.  
An interesting wrinkle in framing effects arises though when the probabilities of 
outcomes are manipulated. For gain frames, the propensity to take risks increases for 
lower likelihood outcomes, while higher likelihood outcomes decrease risk. This effect 
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tends to reverse for loss frames - greater risk-taking in high likelihood outcomes and 
reduced risk-taking in low likelihood outcomes. This pattern is referred to as the 
“fourfold pattern of risk attitudes” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, p. 308) and is of special 
interest to the decision research community, in that risk attitudes are flipped simply by 
the types of outcomes that may occur (see Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 
1999, for a review confirming the efficacy of framing effects). 
This cognitive distinction between rewards and punishments often leads to “losses 
looming larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), where the negative feelings 
anticipated from potential losses are much greater than the positive feelings aroused by a 
potential reward. It is crucial though to make point of the wording and stress that “losses 
looming larger than gains” does not necessarily equate to “losses are actually stronger 
than gains”. Accordingly, Prospect Theory postulates asymmetric psychophysical 
properties between ‘Decision’ Utility (anticipated utility - Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
and ‘Experienced’ Utility, in that how an agent feels a decision will affect him/her may 
not match the actual hedonic experience. 
 
FORECASTING 
 When the precise nature of decision outcomes is unknown, an individual’s choice 
is often predicated upon the outcome anticipated to yield the greatest affectual return 
(Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Mellers & McGraw, 2001). Loss aversion can 
interfere with this process if the asymmetry between gains and losses in decision utility is 
not appropriately reflected in one’s experienced utility. If, however, these utilities of 
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gains and losses are inherently different, the justification to forgo a $15 reward in lieu of 
possibly incurring a $10 loss is rationally admissible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
Previous research has suggested this may not be the case though, as participants tended to 
overestimate the duration and intensity of their reactions to negative scenarios, such as 
the dissolution of relationships, or denial of tenure and employment (Gilbert, Pinel, 
Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004).  
In addition, participants also displayed a significant hedonic and temporal 
asymmetry of monetary losses only in the predictive stages of a decision (Kermer, 
Driver-Linn, Wilson & Gilbert, 2004). Experienced losses were significantly less potent 
than initially estimated, and statistically equivalent to experienced rewards. Thus, this 
confluence of misjudgments may lead a person to believe that most, if not all negative 
events hold a greater affectual impact relative to themselves and gains than they actually 
do, though this relationship is not immutable. 
 
DELAY DISCOUNTING 
As a brief aside that will be relevant to religious behavior and the subsequent 
section on cognition, it is helpful to discuss another important type of probabilistic 
decision-making, notably when consequences will occur in the future. Delay discounting 
is a behavioral phenomenon illustrated by an agent’s subjective value of a reward or 
punishment decaying as a function of time (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967). That is, gaining 
[losing] $100 today is weighted much more heavily than gaining [losing] $100 next 
week, thereby promoting gains with immediate payoffs or neglecting future punishments. 
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But, because future stimuli are important to plan for, our behavior accounts for this by a 
willingness to accept larger amounts of compensation as the temporal distance from the 
present also increases. For example, in order to forgo a $100 reward today, the future 
reward may need to be at least $150, and the larger the value of the delayed stimuli, the 
greater the rate of discounting (i.e., the less future stimuli are subjectively valued). This 
discount rate can then be compared within or between-subjects in myriad ways, whether 
as a function of the outcome type, their value, delay, or likelihood of attainment (Rachlin, 
Raineri, & Cross, 1991). 
This suggests immediate behaviors and consequences are more highly prioritized, 
and generally for good reason. Until recent scientific and medical advances, one’s 
lifespan was often more susceptible to the volatile fluctuations of the environment, be it 
resource competition, medicinal/health quality (e.g., infant mortality rate) or natural 
disasters that could prematurely end a lifespan. To the extent that it afforded an 
opportunity to consume resources or reproduce, it was clearly advantageous not to wait. 
However, analogous to probabilistic gambles where risk aversion can lead to over-
favoring certainty, rates of future discounting can fall into a similar pattern. Instead of a 
future stimuli’s value decaying equally (exponentially) across time points, there is an 
extremely rapid decrease in its value over the short-run, followed by a flattening of the 
value for more distant time steps (i.e., a hyperbolic function - Mazur, 1987; Figure 2 - 
Green & Myerson, 1996). And behavior following this hyperbolic model often leads to 
greater impulsivity in choices, spurning optimal, future outcomes in favor of immediate, 
lesser ones. These behaviors can also be empirically connected to risk aversion, with 
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Frederick (2005) suggesting individuals who display steeper discount rates will also 
display more pronounced risk aversion patterns in monetary choices. Ioannou and Sadeh 
(2016) did not share this conclusion for either monetary or environmental risks, but 
theorized this discrepancy as possibly resulting from incentivized tasks. 
 
Figure 2 – Exponential and Hyperbolic Discount Functions 
 
 
BEHAVIORAL PARAMETERIZATION 
While Kahneman and Tversky were not the first researchers to recognize and 
record empirical violations of economic axioms of decision-making (Markowitz, 1952; 
Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1962; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971), their pioneering work on 
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formulating a rigorous descriptive model of behavior was instrumental for a deeper 
comprehension of the nuances and lability of judgments and choices. Although the theory 
in a general sense helped to explain misjudgments and choice inconsistencies, perhaps its 
greatest contribution was laying the foundations for a formal parameterization of risky 
behavior above and beyond binary choice sets. Despite Tversky and Kahneman’s 
rejection of within-subjects designs, by eliciting an indifference point (or a participant’s 
point of preference reversal between two choices) through repeated measures designs, an 
individual’s precise specifications can be determined and compared across choices in 
other tasks, participants and studies. To contextualize this, monetary gambles are a 
common methodology as they offer a quantitatively standardized scale to measure 
degrees of risk and loss aversion. 
 
risk aversion 
Gambles measuring risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) typically consist 
of a choice between two alternatives: A) either a probabilistic outcome between a reward 
[loss] and a null outcome ($0), or B) a guaranteed reward [loss] - also called a Certainty 
Equivalent (CE), which acts as a deterrent to the gamble - illustrated below. 
 
Which of the following would you prefer? 
A: 50% chance to win $1000 and 50% chance to win nothing 
OR 
B: $450 for sure 
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Winning $1000 is enticing, but walking away with $450 is also quite appealing and 
forgoing this reward in lieu of potentially losing the bet might sting. By having 
participants clearly define their CE with an explicit value, or by scaling the amounts 
through repeated choices, their ‘Relative Risk Premium’ (RRP - Eq 1; Rieger et al., 2011) 
can be calculated to determine rates of risk tolerance.  
Eq. 1) 𝑅𝑅𝑃 =  !" ! !"!"  
The lower an individual’s CE, the more positive their RRP and the more risk-averse they 
are, relative to the expected value of the gamble presented (smaller and smaller amounts 
of guaranteed outcomes are not enough to prefer taking the gamble). Conversely, the 
higher the CE, the more negative their RRP and the more risk-taking they are, relative to 
the EV of the gamble (they will continue declining higher guaranteed amounts in pursuit 
of the gamble). 
 
 loss aversion 
 While risk and loss are similar in nature, they are also clearly different - risk does 
not always entail loss, and loss can be exhibited in riskless, or non-probabilistic, 
scenarios (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). That being said, utilizing monetary gambles 
similar to risk aversion is still the most effective method of parameter estimation; only in 
this case by directly pitting rewards against losses without null or certain outcomes. 
Suppose Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) original gamble was presented again, but 
collapsed into a single 50-50 chance of either winning or losing $100. This parameter can 
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be estimated similarly to the RRP: calculating it through a series of accept/reject choices 
of gambles with varying gain and loss amounts, or specifically defining the necessary 
rewards to offset potential losses. The latter method is referred to as the Gain/Loss Ratio 
(G/L - Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) and derives its name from the estimation technique, 
dividing the specified gain amount by the loss amount. For example, if a participant 
required $150 to offset a $100 loss, their loss aversion coefficient would be 1.5 
(150/100). Lower G/L ratios imply less loss aversion; larger G/L ratios imply greater loss 
aversion. There are other, more intricate ways of measuring this parameter, but the G/L 
ratio is simple and can reliably differentiate behavioral patterns in a between-subjects 
paradigm, like in the present project. 
 
SUMMARY 
 Risk preferences stemming from aversion to uncertainty and loss can lead to 
interesting violations of statistically optimal decision-making in a given scenario. And 
research has shown that the asymmetry between estimating the impact of an outcome and 
its actual experience can be ascribed to the subjectivity of the behavioral process. 
Moreover, many of these violations can be ameliorated under objective analysis, 
following a set of axioms developed to maximize one’s output that are accessible but 
often neglected. The question is then, why does this occur?  If individuals possess the 
necessary cognitive aptitudes to overcome errors in thinking and aversion to beneficial 
situations, why is it so difficult to tap into? 
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CHAPTER 3 
DUAL-SYSTEM FRAMEWORK OF COGNITION 
DUAL-SYSTEM MODELS 
 Sloman (1996). 
 A critical element of risk preferences is the formulation of these judgments in 
relation to the mechanisms of differential, yet complementarily functioning cognitive 
systems. Conceptually, the roots of this notion can be traced back to Ancient Greek 
philosophy (Aristotle - cited in Sloman, 1996), with Plato comparing these processes to 
controlling a chariot with two horses, one well-trained and the other wild. More recently, 
psychologists and philosophers such as William James (1890/1950; cited in Sloman, 
1996) have also attested to a general cognitive capacity of both parallel and serial 
processing mechanisms. 
 However, it wasn’t until Steven Sloman (1996), that a formal, empirically 
oriented theory of a dual-system model of categorization and reasoning was proposed. 
Although Sloman’s own work at the time was in its nascent stages, the foundation of his 
arguments encompassed an extensive literature on human language processing, 
reasoning, judgments and choice. Theory and data compiled from these research domains 
yielded evidence distinguishing between two modes of cognition, which he labeled the 
Associative System and the Rules-based System. The associative system is characterized 
as judgments governed by principles of automaticity, speed, similarity and contiguity, 
and Sloman illustrates these functions as: intuition, creativity, associative memory and 
visual recognition. These cognitive mechanics provide an agent with the ability to 
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quickly draw rough statistical inferences from one’s environment, based on similarity and 
generalization from personal experiences that serve as flexible guidelines with soft 
constraints. 
 Conversely, the rules-based cognitive system is primarily portrayed as a symbol 
manipulator, derived from one’s culture, language and formal systems. The 
computational procedures in this system are slow, but engender deliberative, logical 
interpretations of causality and purpose from environmental information collected. Its 
processing is productive and systematic, in diametric opposition to the automaticity of the 
associative system, and applies hard constraints to the reasoning strategies utilized and 
judgments rendered. Sloman suggests the rules-based cognitive mechanisms must be 
initiated when greater processing is required, or to monitor, and correct if necessary, the 
associative system’s encoding and conclusions. However, he also notes the application of 
the rules-based system to reasoning does not guarantee optimal solutions. It is merely a 
process-oriented approach to behavior. 
 
 Kahneman (2003) 
 Daniel Kahneman (2003) built upon Sloman’s and others’ theories (Stanovich & 
West, 2000; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), primarily driven by his and Amos Tversky’s 
research on judgments and heuristics investigating errors of intuitive thinking (Sloman’s 
associative system was now labeled colloquially as either ‘System 1’ [Stanovich & West, 
2000] or ‘intuition’ [Kahneman & Frederick, 2002]; the rules-based system was changed 
to either ‘System 2’ [S&W, 2000] or ‘Reflective’/’Reasoning’ [K&F, 2002]). Figure 3 
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below shows this framework, and now includes perceptions in the model, suggesting that 
while the perceptual and intuitive processes are similar, the nature of their respective 
content evaluated differs. Between intuitive and reflective cognition, this relationship is 
reversed, in that the content evaluated is similar but their respective processes through 
which that content is evaluated are quite different. 
 
Figure 3. - Process and Content in Two Cognitive Systems proposed by Kahneman, 2003 
 
 
Kahneman then adds further dimensions to each cognitive structure, suggesting 
System 1’s proficiency may be due to ‘attribute substitution’ (Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002), a method of breaking down complex problems into smaller, simpler and more 
manageable pieces. However, he also cautions this system can be prone to emotional 
reactivity in judgments and are governed by habits, making them difficult to control or 
alter. Moreover, because cognitive capacitance is limited, System 2’s effortful application 
to judgments can be laborious to initiate and sustain, thus potentially causing interference 
between concurrent effortful tasks, or permitting System 1 to run amok. Kahneman 
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reaffirms Sloman’s proposed cognitive hierarchy of System 2 monitoring and suppressing 
System 1’s initial judgments (for neurological evidence, see De Martino, Kumaran, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; for integration into the dual-system framework, see Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2007), as well as asserting task-interference designs can reliably demarcate 
the invocation of each system between judgments, tasks and choices. 
 
HEURISTICS 
 Kahneman’s (2003) dual-system model of cognition delineated between 
perceptions and intuitions. This was very important, as intuition is not constrained by 
immediate information as perceptions are; rather, it is a cognitive function fully capable 
of integrating past information into judgments an agent will make in the future, by 
forming “impressions of the attributes of objects or perception and thought” (p. 699). 
However, System 1 sits (metaphorically, of course) in an interesting position then, 
sharing its processing and content of evaluation with two mutually exclusive cognitive 
functions. It has the capacity to rapidly filter through massive amounts of information and 
come to generally accurate conclusions of the past, present and future, sans the 
metabolically taxing effort and temporality of System 2. How might it accomplish such 
feats? 
 A heuristic is a method of problem solving employed by an agent through which, 
by trading off optimality for efficiency, an adequate solution can be discovered and 
recalled for future utilization. Its application to cognition originated from Herbert Simon 
(1955), who coined the term ‘satisficing’, judgments and choices an individual makes 
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that are “good enough” despite lacking statistical optimality. Recalling back to the 
previous section on Prospect Theory, where subjects exhibited behavioral inconsistencies 
that systematically violated normative models, it may come as little surprise that Tversky 
and Kahneman’s empirical exploration of heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) paved the way for Prospect Theory as a descriptive model 
of choice behavior. 
 Their foray into pitting the statistical intuition of experts and laypeople alike 
against normative calculations led to the development of a number of specific heuristics 
used to expedite the cognitive process, most notably availability and representativeness. 
The availability heuristic is a memory-based evaluation of content, and 
representativeness is a method of assessing or organizing similar stimuli according to a 
general prototype. To conceptualize these, consider the following decision vignettes and 
their respective results: 
 
Availability: 
In four pages of a novel (about 2,000 words), how many words would you expect to find 
that have the form “ _ _ _ _ i n g” (seven-letter words ending with “ing”)? Indicate your 
best estimate by circling one of the values below: 
0 1-2 3-4 5-7 8-10 11-15 16+ 
 
A second form of this problem asked subjects the same question, but with seven-
letter words consisting of the form “ _ _ _ _ _ n _”. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) found 
that the median estimate for words ending with “ing” was 13.4, while the median 
estimate for words with the form only “n” as the 6th letter was 4.7. However, because 
any seven-letter word ending with the form of “ing” has ‘n’ as the 6th letter, it is 
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statistically impossible for there to be more cases of it than seven-letter words with only 
‘n’ as the 6th letter. Tversky and Kahneman argued the ability to recall words ending 
with “ing” is much easier than words with only ‘n’ as the 6th letter visible, leading to the 
inverted results and violation. 
 
Representativeness: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in Philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
○ Linda is a teacher at an elementary school 
○ Linda is active in the feminist movement (F) 
○ Linda is a psychiatric social worker 
○ Linda is a bank teller (T) 
○ Linda is an insurance saleswoman 
○ Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement (T&F) 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) asked participants to rank-order which choice is 
more probable, or provide probability estimates, given the personality sketch. They found 
that 82-85% of subjects believed “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement” (T&F) as more likely than “Linda is a bank teller” (T), violating the 
conjunction axiom of probability theory (they ranked Linda as a feminist (F) as more 
likely than both (T) and (T&F) though). “Conjunction” in probability theory is the 
likelihood that two (or more) events will occur - e.g., the chance that it is cloudy and 
windy today - but without one necessarily depending on the other (which is called 
conditional probability). The corollary of this axiom is that the likelihood of both events 
occurring cannot exceed the likelihood of one of the single events - i.e., there cannot be a 
greater chance it is both cloudy and windy today, than only cloudy or only windy. 
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Tversky and Kahneman argued these results fit representativeness, with 
participants believing that because Linda resembles the prototype of a feminist, she will 
be more likely to fit a conjunction comprised of the target characterization (feminist) and 
a neutral target (bank teller), above and beyond an option with just the neutral target. 
 
Base-Rate Neglect: 
While base-rate neglect is not a heuristic, it serves as a salient example of how brushing 
over details of single-event likelihood estimates can skew judgments. Consider the 
scenario (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Graboys, 1978): 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive rate of 5%, 
what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result actually has the disease, 
assuming no prior knowledge? 
 
 Casscells and colleagues originally found that the modal response was 0.95, the 
average was 0.56, and only 18% of subjects correctly responded 0.02. Cosmides and 
Tooby (1990) replicated this effect, with only 12% of subjects correctly responding 
(although in the next section, they show how to reduce this effect). The reason this is 
called ‘base-rate neglect’ is because subjects tended to assess the likelihood of a positive 
test if the patient does have the disease, and not the likelihood of the patient having the 
disease (which is unknown) given a positive test, the latter of which uses the base-rate 
1/1000 in its likelihood calculations. 
Additionally, Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007) put forth another 
heuristic, affect, wherein the emotionality of judgments and outcomes may significantly 
influence behavioral processes using the “pain principle” - pursue pleasure and avoid 
pain. Altogether, these cognitive shortcuts aim to drastically reduce the time and effort of 
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judgments/decisions by boiling down relevant information to the essentials and 
processing them in a parallel manner, through which the most satisfactory conclusion can 
be made. 
 
CRITICAL REVIEW: EVANS (2008) 
 To rein in the surfeit dual-system models proposed after its initial inception, each 
with similar yet distinguishable qualities, Jonathan Evans (2008) collated an extensive 
review and weighed in on the manner. Although generally agreeing with the overall 
notion of dual-processes of cognition, Evans suggests it does not necessarily imply a 
general dual-system framework, which he calls “oversimplified and misleading” (p. 270). 
Because the operations and underlying architecture of each purported system are not 
mutually exclusive, and both “systems” may consist of overlapping elements of 
preconscious and conscious processes, it is difficult to wholly map onto independent 
mechanisms. He attempts to resolve these inconsistencies by offering a key distinction - 
“type 2 processes are those that require access to a single, capacity-limited central 
working memory resource” (p. 270), and that the overload and interference of working 
memory can disrupt slow, sequential processing.  
Other researchers have taken this a step further and argued that a uni-system 
model of cognition is superior (Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Keren & Schul, 2009; 
Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011), as the evidence that ostensibly supports dual-system 
theories actually lacks adequate power in explaining and predicting behavior. Gigerenzer 
and Regier (1996) claim both intuitive and reflective judgments are rule-based, and 
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through a “routinization” of shared rules, deliberative judgments can become intuitive 
(Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Moreover, Keren and Schul (2009) assert that System 
2 relies on System 1’s input or else it would fail, clearly signaling interdependence 
between the two alleged systems.  
 
SUMMARY 
 Kahneman and Tversky’s (and others) ‘Heuristics and Biases Program’ (HBP; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983) swept through 
the research world, demonstrating instances of cognitive deficiencies in rapid 
probabilistic judgments and risky decisions. And this was attributed to a reliance on 
intuitive cognition and failure to initiate reflective reasoning that can override automatic 
judgments. Despite their acknowledgments on the efficacy of these routine mental 
faculties, the evidence was as damning as it was alarming - systematic deviations from 
normative probabilistic judgments were observed, even when the correct answers were 
seemingly right in the decision vignettes themselves, in both laypeople and expert 
statisticians alike (Tversky & Kahneman, 1972). Man as an “intuitive statistician” was in 
severe jeopardy. How could one’s judgment so crassly neglect fundamental probabilistic 
principles (i.e., base-rates, conjunction) built into the scenarios? More importantly 
though, was what if these conclusions were wrong? 
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICISMS 
While there exists literature debating Prospect Theory’s accuracy as a descriptive 
utility function of decision-making under risk (Levy & Levy, 2002a, 2002b; Baltussen, 
Post, & Van Vliet, 2006; Nwogugu, 2006), many focus on the specific mathematical 
parameterizations of the function (as opposed to the general estimates described earlier). 
Although that scope is not the focus of this review, their methodological qualms as to 
why Kahneman and Tversky’s findings may be invalid, unreliable or merely a 
“transitional stage” (Gigerenzer, 1991, p. 3) are, as an entire body of past, current and 
future research may be based on misleading foundations and incorrect conclusions. 
Therefore, an analysis of criticisms and counterarguments is necessary to understand the 
efficacy of risk preferences; if loss aversion does not hold water, then any results of this 
current project are suspect. 
 
HEURISTICS 
 Spearheading the opposition to Kahneman and Tversky’s ‘Heuristics and Biases 
Program’ (HBP) was Gerd Gigerenzer and his formulation of a theoretical framework 
called ‘Probabilistic Mental Models’ (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinboelting, 1991). This 
work sought to properly describe and explain probabilistic judgments within a formal, 
frequentist model, a manner he argued HBP lacked. Gigerenzer’s primary critiques of 
HBP (Gigerenzer, 1991) were two-fold: 1) the conjunction axiom of probability theory 
cannot be rigorously applied to single-event judgments/choices. Instead, frequentist-
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framed scenarios were more appropriate. 2) HBP lacked a coherent description of what 
cognitive heuristics entailed from a mechanistic perspective. He also questioned how 
“biases were actually biases” when they could be reduced and even perform optimally in 
many ecological situations and within-subjects presentations.  
To illustrate these differences, recall the Linda Problem and how Tversky and 
Kahneman argued violations of the conjunction axiom could be explained by 
representativeness. Gigerenzer disagreed with this supposition, contending that Tversky 
and Kahneman’s heuristics are, “largely undefined concepts and can post hoc be used to 
explain almost everything” (1991, p. 102). Moreover, he condemns using single-event 
probabilities with distracting fillers between ‘Bank Teller’ and “Bank teller and is active 
in the Feminist Movement” as a legitimate methodology, opting instead for frequency-
based judgments with response contiguity that are much easier to understand: 
There are 100 persons who fit the description above (i.e., Lindas). How many of them 
are: 
A) Bank tellers 
B) Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement 
 
He cites Fiedler's (1988) results, showing that only 22% and 17% of participants violated 
the conjunction axiom in this context. Gigerenzer then cites Cosmides and Tooby (1990), 
who showed how this type of presentation also reduced ‘base-rate neglect’, with 76% and 
92% of participants properly identifying 0.02 as the statistically correct likelihood of a 
patient with a positive test actually having the disease. 
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 rebuttals 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1996) responded to Gigerenzer’s critiques, arguing that 
they themselves initially found that frequentist and within-subjects methods can reduce 
these biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), but this effect is not as stable as Gigerenzer 
insists (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982). They 
claimed this de-legitimizes his criticisms as ignoring counterevidence, and that within-
subjects presentations aren’t ecologically valid and can too obviously cue participants to 
correct their responses. They further claim the development of a theoretical model of 
heuristic analyses is moot and the lack of such does not discredit the role of 
representativeness in intuitive prediction:  
This objection misses the point that representativeness (like similarity) can be 
assessed experimentally; hence it need not be defined a priori. Testing the 
hypothesis that probability judgments are mediated by representativeness does not 
require a theoretical model of either concept. The heuristic analysis only assumes 
that the latter is used to assess the former and not vice versa (1996, p. 585) 
 
They also found his criticism of single-event conjunctive probabilities problematic, 
suggesting it is highly improbable he disregards an individual’s subjective probability, 
and more so to consider them devoid of meaning and normative rigor - individuals simply 
must be able to assign an appropriate likelihood to a decision without necessarily 
considering their behavior in repeated trials. They further state that the dissipation of 
cognitive illusions is not the only aspect of interest to them, but rather their very 
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existence - “The Mueller-Lyer Illusion, for example, “disappears” when the two figures 
are embedded in a rectangular frame, but this observation does not make the illusion less 
interesting” (p. 586). 
 Gigerenzer (1996) responded to Kahneman and Tversky (1996), echoing PMM as 
a well-founded theoretical framework of heuristic judgments and his original critiques of 
HBP: principles of probability theory cannot be so strictly applied to single-event 
outcomes; definitions alone cannot describe mental processes - testable and falsifiable 
models must be instantiated; and within-subjects testing is a viable and ecological 
research methodology. However, he does make an important clarification, in that 
frequentist formats are not necessarily an end-all solution to misjudgments; only that they 
aid in making proper evaluations, in part by simplifying complex single-event probability 
calculations. Regardless of their disagreement, Gigerenzer stresses “understanding how 
people reason under a bewildering variety of circumstances” (1996, p. 595), and implores 
Kahneman and Tversky to do the same for his recommendations on researching not just if 
these biases disappear, but why or why not. 
 
SEMANTIC INFERENCE 
 One additional theme that arose in Gigerenzer’s (1996) reply concerning the 
dichotomy between probabilistic and frequentist judgments was the linguistic aspects of 
the Linda Problem. Take for example, “We invited friends and colleagues to the party” 
(Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001). Here, the ‘and’ operator can denote membership 
in one or 
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Gigerenzer argued that the semantic ambiguity of “Linda is a bank teller and is active in 
the feminist movement”, coupled with the use of the word ‘probable’ when ranking 
choices, could possibly lead participants to believe if ‘Linda is a bank teller” then it 
excludes her activity in a feminist movement, Linda being in either of the categories 
satisfies the conjunction, or interpreting it as a conditional - i.e., if Linda is a bank teller, 
then she is also active in the feminist movement. Because of this he claims the behavior 
observed cannot be evaluated under normative standards. Since the word ‘probable’ 
evokes plausibility, or having the appearance of truth, this loosens the hard constraints of 
probabilistic conjunction. 
 Linguistic analyses (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999) substantiated this claim, 
yielding significant differences in how participants interpreted ‘probability’ and 
‘frequency’. Participants consistently inferred non-mathematical interpretations from 
‘probability’ - i.e., “possibility”, “correspondence”, “applicability” and “conceivability” - 
and overwhelmingly exhibited conjunction effects (83%). Conversely, participants 
consistently interpreted ‘frequency’ as mathematical - i.e., “how often”, “number”, 
“percentage” and “proportion” - and “never violated the conjunction rule” (p. 288). And 
this effect was then replicated without using the word ‘frequency’, demonstrating the 
context, and not just the terminology, is important. 
 Further dispute regarding the ‘and’ operator in the Linda Problem culminated 
with an “adversarial collaboration” between Hertwig and Kahneman, mediated by 
Mellers (Mellers et al., 2001), attempting to reduce conjunction effects by using “and 
are”, “who are” and “feminist bank teller” in lieu of “and is”. However, these results were 
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not so equivocal, showing that although conjunction effects disappeared when the filler 
items were removed for “and are”, “who are” and even “and is”, only “who are” 
significantly reduced conjunction effects in the presence of filler options. Ultimately, 
Hertwig and Kahneman still had some different perspectives on the matter regardless of 
the results (as was expected). Nonetheless, some progress was made, as Hertwig 
conceded that the semantic ambiguity of “and” was not the only influence of conjunction 
effects, while Kahneman accepted representativeness could be lessened in different, 
equally likely linguistic contexts. 
 Gigerenzer (2008) neatly summarizes his work as an alternative to Kahneman, 
Tversky and Slovic’s HBP, proposing common misconceptions of heuristics and an 
“adaptive toolbox” likely comprised of, but not limited to 10 processes (unsurprisingly 
lacking availability, representativeness, or affect) that instead promote efficacious 
ecological behavior: satisficing, recognition, take the best, or default (status quo). 
Gigerenzer states: “the goal of a [darwinian] organism is not to follow logic, but to 
pursue objectives in its environment” (p. 25) and provides evidence these methods can 
reliably outperform mathematical optimization techniques in practical scenarios. He 
concludes his arguments calling for a deeper understanding of heuristics in the 
environment and how to mitigate errors by altering their usage or the environment itself. 
 
PROSPECT THEORY 
 While the preceding counterarguments primarily focused on the efficacy of 
judgments leading to putative violations of normative models of decision-making, this 
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section presents some methodological counters to the actual implemented designs of risk 
preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Recall the S-shaped value function of 
Prospect Theory (PT) - risk aversion in gains and risk-seeking in losses. These results 
derived from asking participants to select between binary choice sets with congruent 
outcomes in the frames, i.e., none of the gambles matched a reward against a loss. Levy 
and Levy (LL - 2002a, 2002b) argued this methodology is intractable given the complex 
nature of investments, involving both positive and negative consequences. To support 
this claim, they ran a series of experiments that included mixed-frame gambles and results 
strongly suggested participants’ choices in this respect significantly deviated from PT; 
single-frame gambles replicated PT’s original results. This lead LL to adamantly reject 
PT as an accurate descriptive model of decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
 rebuttal 
 Soon after LL’s reports came out, Wakker (2003) re-analyzed their data and fired 
back, asserting their results actually do support PT and that LL had failed to properly 
incorporate their data into Tversky and Kahneman’s updated (1992) model. When the 
data are modeled correctly, their results agree with PT and their interpretations are 
rendered asinine; Baucells and Heukamp (2004) replicated this rebuttal as well (although 
Baltussen, Post, & Van Vliet, 2006 argue in favor of LL). Additionally (and this is my 
argument), they explicitly state PT only uses single frame outcomes. And yet, though 
they cite Tversky and Kahneman’s 1992 article, they completely ignore their use of 
mixed gambles leading to the conclusions in that very article. 
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LOSS AVERSION 
 Despite the literature criticizing heuristics and PT, the general notion of loss 
carrying a greater psychophysical weight than gains seems stable (Tom et al., 2007). 
While some research has sought to define its boundaries (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005) 
or pointed out instances of reversal (Harinck et al., 2007), this phenomenon marched on. 
Recently however, more poignant research has begun to show weaknesses in loss 
aversion as a domain-general behavior (Ert & Erev, 2013), or an explanation of status 
quo biases and risk bet premiums (Gal, 2006). Walasek and Stewart (2015) took this 
criticism a step further, claiming loss aversion is merely a product of research designs 
and ran a modified replication of the results from Tom and colleagues’ (2007) article, 
who found a loss aversion rate of about 2:1 in their study. Their criticism of this article 
came from Tom and colleagues using gain values ranging from $10-$40 and loss values 
ranging from $5-$20, which they argued artificially creates a 2:1 loss aversion ratio.  
To amend this asymmetry, they compared this range with a balanced range, but 
also included ranges with greater loss values. Results from the condition congruent with 
Tom and colleagues’ study replicated their original results, but loss aversion in the 
balanced condition largely disappeared. Interestingly, risk seeking was slightly increased 
in the condition with larger loss ranges. The authors conclude by acknowledging loss 
aversion as a behavior phenomenon that can arise as a result of “an asymmetry in the 
distribution of gains and losses...reflected in people’s memory” (e.g., small but frequent 
bank withdrawals, and large but fewer bank deposits - p. 10), but restate their claim that it 
can be largely elicited as a product of design. 
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RECONCILIATION 
 This contradicting body of research is naturally of great importance. Given that 
the direction of this research project concerns the behavioral aspects of loss aversion in 
single-event choices, due caution must be urged regarding the validity and reliability of 
any results found and interpretations made. Nonetheless, there exist other loss aversion 
paradigms that are currently still methodologically credible, along with a dual-process 
cognitive framework. 
 Thus, the manner in which judgments are generated, whether intuitively or 
reflectively (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), is crucial to decision-making, as an over-
reliance on heuristics or failure to properly initiate corrective reasoning may cause the 
retention of intuitively compelling, but discordant or false responses. Frederick’s (2005) 
‘Cognitive Reflection Test’ (CRT), a three item assessment of these cognitive styles 
suggests participants who respond more intuitively to the questions display risk 
preferences with greater loss aversive tendencies and steeper rates of delay discounting 
(replicated by Hardisty & Weber, 2009; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2017). Furthermore, 
research has shown how cognitively intuitive proclivities are not only linked with greater 
propensity to hold paranormal/religious beliefs (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005, 2007), but 
that inducing intuitive or reflective mindsets, in both positive and negative frames, can 
also significantly alter these beliefs (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 5 
RELIGION 
 The reach and strength of religion’s influence on people and cultures around the 
world is profound. Whether it is an individual engaging in religious practices or societal 
gatherings to partake in rites and customs, these beliefs permeate through one’s 
perspectives about the world and affect the decisions they make in the environment. 
Hommel and Colzato (2010) offer a slightly more provocative framework of this 
relationship though: religions can act as a cognitive control-guide permanently altering 
perceptual and attentional processing of information, and that re-directing attention to or 
away from important states helps individuals follow the principles of their belief. The 
reinforcement of these values may instill them as deeply ingrained, long-lasting default 
control styles, facilitating judgments and choices when faced with uncertainty. 
 In a review analyzing religious identification and behaviors, this sentiment seems 
to be well supported, with religiosity strongly relating to self-control and regulation but 
not necessarily self-monitoring (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). These relationships 
present an interesting case then. Most doctrines encourage moderation (or abstinence) of 
resource consumption, charitable donations, sexual reticence, et cetera. And all of these 
behavioral modulators have a clear purpose: some form of eternal salvation or karmic 
reward meant to trump any immediately pleasurable activities an individual may engage 
in. By not indulging in immediate, smaller rewards, they maximize future rewards. 
Connecting this with risk preferences, will there be observable differences in discount 
rates, future planning and risk aversion as a function of religiosity? 
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RELIGIOSITY AND RISK PREFERENCES 
 delay discounting 
 Indeed, previous research has demonstrated how participants with greater 
religious beliefs (or fundamentalism) and conviction tend to be more future oriented 
(Oner-Ozkan, 2007) and discount future rewards less than non-religious participants 
(Carter et al., 2012). However, Paglieri and colleagues (2013) studied Dutch Calvinists (a 
highly conservative Protestant sect), Italian Catholics and Atheists from both countries, 
and found that while Calvinists were significantly more future oriented than Catholics 
and Atheists, Catholics were significantly less future oriented than Atheists. The authors 
attribute this disparity to Calvinists believing in predestination and the permanence of 
actions across their lifespan, while Catholics believe in confession, permitting more 
flexibility in short-term behavior. These denominational differences are vital to 
understanding and disentangling between-subjects from within-subjects variability, as 
observed differences may be incorrectly ascribed to the general ideology rather than the 
intensity of individual factors. For example, Shenhav and colleagues’ (2017) studies 
contrast this general notion, showing a steeper discount rate for individuals who self-
identify as more religious and with greater conviction, although religious demographics 
were not recorded. These differences are quite stimulating and serve as a reminder of the 
complexities of constructs under examination, wherein a multi-perspective approach must 
ultimately be the goal. However, these nuanced analyses demand greater sample sizes 
and are therefore more time consuming and expensive. 
 
 35 
 
 risk aversion 
  With empirical evidence observing these tentative relationships between 
religiosity, cognitive styles and delay discounting that warrants credence, will similar 
associations exist with risk aversion? First, in a cross-cultural analysis (Miller, 2000), 
there was a tendency for both Western and Eastern cultures to display risk-averse 
behavior, although significant differences were present. Participants from traditional 
western cultures (U.S. & Italy) with a greater proportion of Christians, and Turkey (Islam 
- Turkey is difficult to classify as it straddles Eurasia) displayed significantly stronger 
negative correlations between levels of religiosity and risk-taking than traditional eastern 
cultures (Japan [Buddhist and Shinto] and India [Hindu]). Moreover, between these 
countries, regression coefficients were significantly stronger for the U.S. compared to all 
other countries, stronger for Italy compared to India and Japan, and stronger for Turkey 
compared to Japan. 
 Next, Noussair and colleagues (2012) measured the relationship between risk 
propensity and Christian denominations, Catholic or Protestant, and initial tests 
demonstrated a positive association between religiosity and risk aversion. However, 
results showed no significant differences between these groups in either hypothetical or 
real stake games. Furthermore, religious factors such as frequency of church attendance 
and praying were significantly correlated with risk aversion, but religious belief and 
conviction were not. So overall, while mixed results are present, there seems to be at least 
a general trend as to how particular religions, their denominations and elements of belief 
or practices may or may not play a role in risk-based behavior. But these studies were 
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largely confined to lab-based testing of surveys and designs; do these results hold in an 
ecological context? 
 
GAMBLING 
 While the previous studies primarily utilized general self-report and lab-based 
designs, there is a closely related economic and social behavior individuals may 
frequently entertain: gambling. Gambling consists of staking portions of one’s own (or 
another’s) money (or objects of value) for a probabilistic chance to win greater amounts. 
Gambling can take many forms, from sports/track betting to games of luck (roulette, 
slots) or skill (poker), but the prevailing notion is the same. Recalling back that most 
religions tend to encourage familial responsibilities and moderation of resource 
consumption, and recognize that the excessive pursuit of material wealth can interfere 
with these, do major religions then have explicit stances regarding gambling? 
 According to Kevin King (2013), they do, and negatively so. He states that 
Hinduism and Buddhism frown upon gambling as non-virtuous and leading to moral and 
financial destitution, by placing far too much intrinsic value on external conditions. 
Abrahamic traditions (Judaism and Christianity) also discourage and even outright forbid 
gambling (Islam), denouncing it as laborless or effort-free wealth acquisition and stealing 
from those whom one wins against. However, different sects of these religions hold 
varying gradations of attitudes towards behaviors, and therefore it is helpful to examine 
gambling behavior across Christian sects. 
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 Beginning with participants hailing from Las Vegas itself, Diaz’s (2000) analyses 
between Christian denominations found significant negative relationships between 
frequency of gambling and religious service attendance and importance of faith. 
Gambling frequency also significantly differed across denominations, with Catholics 
gambling the most often and Mormons the least often. Furthermore, the average amount 
gambled was negatively related to service attendance and importance of faith, but did not 
differ across denominations. However, Diaz states many of these correlations were only 
weakly significant or of small effect size and could not substantially establish these 
relationships. Additionally, Lam (2006), using data from the National Gambling Impact 
Commission’s 1999 survey, found similarly consistent results. Gamblers were 
significantly less likely to attend religious services than non-gamblers, and the number of 
games an individual has played (0-4) emerged as a significant, negative predictor of 
service attendance. However, importance of faith was not significantly different between 
gamblers and non-gamblers; and while it significantly predicted gambling frequency, 
only a small-moderate effect size was observed. 
 Ellison and McFarland (2011) did a denominational analysis of gambling 
behaviors across Christian sects and found significant differences as a function of 
religious conservatism. First, conservative Protestants were less likely to engage in mid-
high frequency gambling compared to mainline Protestants, Catholics and non-believers. 
Furthermore, conservative Protestants had significantly stronger negative relationships 
between gambling and service attendance and percentage of one’s social network 
affiliated with their religious congregation - friendships with fellow members and a 
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religious leader acted as a stronger deterrent of gambling propensities than for mainline 
Protestants, Catholics and Jews. Lastly, frequency of prayer was not related to gambling 
behaviors. 
 Given the intriguing empirical connections (or lack thereof) between an 
individual’s cognitive style, religiosity and risk preferences, little research has focused on 
the individual behavioral components of loss aversion as it pertains to religiosity beyond 
Rieger and colleagues’ (2011) initial reports on cultural dispositions. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study was twofold: to further explore if Christian participants exhibit 
greater levels of loss aversion across a series of hypothetical lotteries compared to 
Nonreligious participants; and to examine if/which other factors of religiosity may play a 
role in differential response patterns. 
 
CHAPTER 6 
PRESENT STUDY 
METHODS 
participants. 
250 participants were initially recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) online survey platform and redirected to the tasks on Qualtrics via an 
anonymous link. A power analysis estimated that to detect a moderate effect size (0.5) 
with a power of 0.9 and significance level of 0.05 using independent samples, two-tailed t 
tests, at least 86 subjects per group were necessary. More participants than recommended 
were recruited to adjust for demographically asymmetric response rates and deletion of 
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poor quality data. The total sample used (reduction methods in Appendix A) in the final 
analyses was 180 (50% Christian, 54.2% male, Mage = 33.97). Participants were drawn 
from a U.S. population, aged 18+, who identified as either ‘Christian’ or ‘Nonreligious’, 
and no restrictions on their mTurk worker status (master or non-master classification) 
were used. The assessments lasted approximately 15 minutes and participants were 
compensated $2.00. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at 
Arizona State University (see Appendix C for approval documentation). 
 
design and procedure 
Participants were first presented with a series of 10 uniformly randomized, 
hypothetical lottery tables (Figure 4). Each lottery table consisted of a 50-50 chance to 
lose $5-$140 (intervals of $15) and asking the participants to state the minimum amount 
they would require to potentially win, in order to make each lottery acceptable to play. 
 
Figure 4. - An example lottery table presented to participants. 
 
 
 This specific method was used as it replicated Rieger and colleagues’ (2011) 
design eliciting a simple, yet robust loss aversion coefficient termed the ‘Gain/Loss 
Ratio’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Recall how the participant’s monetary value to 
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make the gamble acceptable is divided by the loss amount originally presented; and the 
larger the quantitative coefficient, the greater the inferred loss aversion. G/L ratios of 
each loss value and their overall average were calculated and log transformed to 
normalize the data. 
 Next, participants were asked to provide demographic information pertaining to 
their age, sex, education status and religious identification. Participants self-identifying as 
‘Christian’ were then asked to provide their denomination, how often they attended 
religious services, and their frequency of prayer, and then answered the 
Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I/E) Religiosity Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989), three subscales 
(Intrinsic, Extrinsic-Personal, Extrinsic-Social) measured on a Likert scale ranging from 
0 (Strongly Disagree) to 4 (Strongly Agree). Participants who self-identified as 
‘Nonreligious’ were only asked to state if they were ‘Atheist’, ‘Agnostic’, or 
‘Unaffiliated’. Both groups of participants then took the nonreligious subscale of the 
Nonreligious Nonspiritual Scale (NRNSS; Cragun, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2015), a 
questionnaire measured on a Likert scale from 0 (Strongly Agree) to 4 (Strongly 
Disagree), developed to validly and reliably measure observable differences of religiosity 
and spirituality between religious and nonreligious individuals. As this study was only 
interested in religiosity of participants, and for time/compensation purposes, the 
spirituality subscale was not used. 
 The final task consisted of a series of 40 short, uniformly randomized and 
individually presented statements sampled from Harris et al.’s (2009) experimental 
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stimuli, in which participants were asked to say whether they believed each statement to 
be ‘True’, ‘False’, or ‘Unsure’. The statements were equally split into four categories: 
 
Religiously True/Nonbeliever False - “Jesus really rose from the dead.” 
Religiously False/Nonbeliever True - “The Biblical story of creation is false.” 
Factually True - “Eagles really exist.” 
Factually False - “Superman really exists.” 
 
 For reasons of time/compensation, we used this abridged version of their original 
240 statements. As all of the religiously oriented statements were confirmed to 
significantly differ by religious identity by Harris and colleagues in a pilot study prior to 
their main experiment, and these statements do not comprise a conglomerated larger 
scale, this subset can be acceptably included for exploratory purposes in relation to the 
certainty of ideological affirmation without sacrificing validity or reliability. In addition 
to the statement responses, response times were measured to assay whether religious and 
nonreligious participants differed in how quickly they affirmed or rejected, or were 
unsure of, doctrinal statements [in]congruent with their religious identity. 
 
RESULTS 
 data analysis 
 As a manipulation check, a two-tailed t test for independent samples was run in 
SPSS V.24 to determine if religious and nonreligious participants differed in their mean 
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responses to the NRNSS. The test revealed significant differences between religious (M = 
1.62) and nonreligious (M = 3.48) participants in the expected direction, t(178) = -
13.539, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.14, -1.59]. 
 Reliability analyses using Cronbach’s alpha were conducted for the ten log 
transformed G/L Ratios (ɑ = .984), NRNSS (ɑ = .963), I/E Intrinsic subscale (ɑ = .855), 
I/E Extrinsic-Social subscale (ɑ = .898), and the I/E Extrinsic-Personal subscale (ɑ = 
.677). Because the I/E Extrinsic-Personal subscale is only three items, deletion of items to 
improve reliability may cause issues with data analysis. 
 
 religious identity and loss aversion 
 Even after a log transformation correction and much more acceptable levels of 
skewness and kurtosis, the Shapiro-Wilk test of non-normality was significant. Therefore, 
independent samples Mann-Whitney U tests were used that yielded non-significant 
differences between religious and nonreligious participants for every lottery, as well as 
the overall averaged G/L Ratio, (p > .05). Table 1 and Figure 5 show the median values 
of each lottery and the overall median, as a function of religious identity. 
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Table 1. - Median Loss Aversion Coefficients separated by Religious Identity. 
Lottery Value Nonreligious G/L Ratio Religious G/L Ratio 
$5 2.00 2.00 
$20 2.50 2.50 
$35 2.36 2.42 
$50 3.00 3.00 
$65 2.31 2.46 
$80 2.50 2.50 
$95 2.53 2.34 
$110 2.49 2.73 
$125 2.40 2.40 
$140 2.50 2.47 
Overall Median 2.49 2.47 
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Figure 5. – Median Loss Coefficients by Religious Identity.
 
Bivariate correlations (Table 2) assessing the relationship between loss aversion 
and religious service attendance, frequency of prayer, intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic social 
religiosity and extrinsic personal religiosity were all nonsignificant (p > .05). Figure 6 
shows the distribution of log Gain/Loss ratios as a function of responding on the NRNSS, 
separated by religious identification. These data were analyzed to ascertain if a quadratic 
relationship existed, but the R-squared value was only 0.0014. 
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Table 2. - Correlation Table of Average Loss Coefficients and Religious Factors 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Log G/L 
Ratio 
-      
2. Service 
Attendance 
.00990 -     
3. Freq. Prayer .06090 .33390** -    
4. I/E Intrinsic .02490 -.34090** -.65190** -   
5. I/E ext. social -.06690 -.50790** -.05890 .08590 -  
6. I/E ext. 
personal 
.00390 -.06490 -.11390 .144 .15890 - 
7. NRNSS avg. .033180 .31490** .46490** -.73490** -.08590 -.2790* 
Pairwise N’s are provided in subscript 
** Correlations significant at the .001 level (two-tailed) 
* Correlations significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
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Figure 6. - Log Gain/Loss Ratio Religiosity and Identity. 
 
 
religious statement responding 
 Pearson Chi-square difference tests in crosstabs analyses replicated Harris and 
colleagues’ (2009) results of religious participants significantly affirming doctrinally true 
statements and rejecting doctrinally false statements compared to nonreligious 
participants. Both groups also correctly validated and rejected factually true and factually 
false statements, respectively, at equivalent rates. Although Mann-Whitney U tests 
showed no significant difference in the median response time, averaged across all 
statements, between religious (Med. = 3.67s) and nonreligious participants (Med. = 
3.40s), nonreligious participants responded significantly faster in 10 (50%) religiously 
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oriented statements, and three (7.5%) factual statements (p < .05; see Appendix B for 
more details on chi-square and response time analyses). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Previous research using monetary gambles has reliably evinced a behaviorally 
salient aversion to losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Tom et al., 2007), the repercussions of which have been attributed to individuals 
deviating from economic rationality in decision-making (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). 
The reliance on, or slacked monitoring of, intuitive judgments susceptible to emotional 
reflexivity (Kahneman, 2003) may lead to this overweighting of negative outcomes, and 
has also been linked to the beliefs one holds, such as in the existence of supernatural 
beings (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005, 2007; Shenhav et al., 2012). Experiments testing the 
reverse relationship of religiosity predicting risk preferences congruent with intuitive 
thinking, while limited, have suggested a similar pattern (Rieger et al., 2011). Thus, the 
present study set out to explore how religious identity and its corresponding factors might 
relate specifically to loss aversion. 
 Despite replicating the overall nature of loss aversion within the sample collected 
(Med. θ = 2.6), no significant main effect was found between religious and nonreligious 
participants. Nor did religious factors significantly predict levels of this aversion. This is 
a puzzling result; religious participants responded significantly different from their 
nonreligious counterparts on the NRNSS and doctrinal statements, but actually tended to 
show lower average loss coefficients. In addition, there was no quadratic relationship 
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between loss aversion and religious responding on the NRNSS present, an analogous 
observation Kahan (2012) found when testing political ideology and cognitive style. 
Kahan’s results suggested participants with greater political convictions (both 
conservative and liberal) provided more reflective answers on Frederick’s (2005) 
cognitive reflection test compared to political moderates, and he interpreted this as 
ideologues being able to initiate deliberative cognition to rationalize one’s beliefs. 
 There appears to be no simple explanation for these results. Every study has a 
likelihood of yielding null results based on the methods, sample, or merely as a 
probabilistic blip, and this present study was not without its limitations. First, previous 
studies have linked Christian orthodoxy (Rieger et al., 2011) and intuitive cognition 
(Frederick, 2005) to increased loss aversion coefficients, and intuitive cognition to a 
general religiosity (Shenhav et al., 2012), but this current experiment did not include 
metrics of either religious fundamentalism or intuitive inclinations. Therefore, while the 
factors of religiosity utilized did not elicit any significant predictive qualities, it may be 
premature to speculate any further without understanding the cognitive strategies 
participants implemented when performing this task. Second, a slight modification of the 
wording used to present the lotteries was made to fit the constraints of Qualtrics’ API, 
possibly leading to some participants interpret the task differently. Third, the overtness of 
the recruitment script requiring a [non]religious identity could have also contributed to 
this result. 
 Of course, it is also entirely possible that there are no practical differences 
between these groups in terms of loss aversion. Therefore, more research is necessary to 
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either suggest this finding as an outlier or substantiate that the ideology and motivational 
factors themselves are not predictive of loss aversion, but rather something the 
fundamentalist mindset ideologies can shape. Future studies could incorporate response 
times of decisions in the lottery or cognitive style items, as Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler 
and Fugelsang (2013) have shown lengthened response latencies and higher accuracy 
rates in analytic reasoning tasks for religious skeptics. Finally, there are a multitude of 
possible designs used in loss aversion literature, such as a dichotomous 
acceptance/rejection of a gamble, and non-monetary (Asian Disease Problem) or riskless 
scenarios, and integrating these along with cognitive attitudes into a religious context 
may paint a better picture of this behavior. 
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Data from 250 participants were initially collected. However, the final data 
analyzed did not reflect this amount as attention tests were failed, and the unconstrained 
lottery values were subject to extreme variability resulting in ratios approaching and 
occasionally surpassing 100; other participants responded in values below a ratio of 0.50. 
To combat this, while still maintaining an essence of the data collected and conforming to 
Rieger et al.’s (2011) methodology and power analyses, participants with an average G/L 
ratio greater than or equal to 100, or below 0.50 were entirely deleted, as well as any who 
failed at least one of the two attention tests. Out of the 250 original participants, 228 were 
retained. A second data reduction method was also run to balance religious affiliation 
groups by randomly dropping Nonreligious subjects. After this round of deletion, 180 (90 
each group) participants were used in the analysis. 
Timing data for the affirmation statements were deleted on a case-wise basis. As 
the average ‘page submit’ response time was typically around 5 seconds, any RT above 
30 seconds will reflect instances above and beyond the required time to read and answer 
the question, especially when the participants’ RT for other statements more closely 
resembles the average. Overall, only less than 8% of timing data were deleted. 
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CHI-SQUARE DIFFERENCE TESTS 
Examples of each of the four stimuli conditions showing the expected response 
[in]congruency as a function of religious or factual statements: 
 
Religiously True: “People who believe in God do so on good evidence” 
 Christians significantly more likely to affirm this statement, 𝜒2 = 58.397, p < .001 
 
Religiously False: “Jesus really did not rise from the dead” 
Christians significantly more likely to reject this statements, 𝜒2 = 109.515, p < 
.001 
 
Factually True: “Eating wrong foods can negatively affect health” 
 Both groups equally likely to affirm this statement, 𝜒2 = .994, p > .05 
 
Factually False: “A high rate of crime is very good for society” 
 Both groups equally likely to reject this statement, 𝜒2 = 1.006, p > .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
TIMING DATA 
Significant results (medians reported; C = Christian, N = Nonreligious; **denotes a 
religiously false statement): 
Q16** - Humans are a product of the natural world, just like all other animals. 
 C = 4.76 N = 3.68 p < .001 
 
Q25** - The Biblical story of creation is purely a myth. 
 C = 3.98 N = 3.10 p < .001 
 
Q32 - Jesus Christ will literally save all human beings who accept his grace. 
 C = 4.41 N = 3.42 p < .001 
 
Q43** - Jesus Christ is very unlikely to return to Earth in a Second Coming 
 C = 4.07 N = 3.64 p = .021 
 
Q44 - A high rate of crime is very good for society. 
 C = 3.72 N = 3.10 p = .013 
 
Q51 - The Bible is the most important book we have. 
 C = 3.55 N = 2.72 p < .001 
 
Q52 - Some Christians will probably go to heaven after death. 
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 C = 3.96 N = 3.65 p = .032 
 
Q54 - Superman is a fictional character. 
 C = 3.21 N = 2.67 p = .002 
 
Q55 - The airplane is a human invention. 
 C = 3.04 N = 2.51 p = .001 
 
Q61** - If Jesus existed, he was conceived naturally, like every other human being. 
 C = 5.11 N = 4.21 p = .005 
 
Q62 - Human cultures are all exactly the same. 
 C = 3.66 N = 3.02 p = .002 
 
Q65 - The Bible is free from error. 
 C = 3.38 N = 3.02 p =.042 
 
Q68 - Jesus Christ really performed the miracles attributed to him in the Bible. 
 C = 3.67 N = 3.04 p = .017 
 
Q73** - Original Sin is nothing more than a myth. 
 C = 3.54 N = 3.03 p = .011  
 66 
 
APPENDIX C 
IRB APPROVAL  
 67 
 
 
 
EXEMPTION GRANTED 
 
 
Elias Robles-Sotelo 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, School of 
602/543-4515 
Elias.Robles@asu.edu 
 
Dear Elias Robles-Sotelo: 
 
On 10/6/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
 
Type of Review: Initial Study 
Title: Factors of Religiosity and Loss Aversion 
Investigator: Elias Robles-Sotelo 
IRB ID: STUDY00005101 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Consent Form, Category: Consent Form; 
• Stimuli, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• Demographics, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus 
group questions); 
• mTurkRecruitmentScript.pdf, Category: Recruitment 
Materials; 
• Howatt-Robles 2016.docx, Category: IRB Protocol; 
 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 10/6/2016.  
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
IRB Administrator 
